Opposition International

“Defending Civic Space: When are Campaigns against Repressive Laws Successful?” offers useful strategic advice on how under-resourced opposition parties and civil society agents of change can at least slow down efforts by autocratic governments to use “first mover” technology to stifle dissent and harass dissenters. Opposition International will look into specific examples that fit the recommendations.

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7026514448559325184?updateEntityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_feedUpdate%3A%28V2%2Curn%3Ali%3Aactivity%3A7026514448559325184%29

It is with gratitude that Opposition International welcomes U Win (a pseudonym for safety reasons) as a contributor. U Win is a researcher and human rights activist from Myanmar, with 10 years’ experience working and writing about politics, human rights and the criminal justice system of Myanmar. U Win’s research interests include access to justice and rule of law.

The submission deals with a little-known pledge by the Military government of Myanmar to replace the current First Past the Post (FPP)!voting method with some form of Proportional Representation (PR). According to one report, “Under the junta’s plan, seats in parliament would be given to parties based on the percentage of the vote they received nationwide. In both of the previous two elections, the NLD was awarded a percentage of seats that was higher than the percentage it secured of the national vote.”

As anyone who has cut his teeth on the Arrow Theorem and the mathematics of representation, it is difficult to predict the result from a PR system because of the alchemy of coalition politics.

***

A Shift from FPP to PR: What does it mean for Ethnic and Smaller parties in Myanmar

U Win

Myanmar had held five general elections since its dependence from the British in 1948. The most recent election was held in 2020. Throughout history, Myanmar used First Past the Post system (FPP). For the past few months, many news media have reported that Myanmar Junta is gearing up for the next general election in 2023. One of the most discussed topics has been the electoral system- a shift from FPP to Proportional Representation (PR). Since day one, the State Administrative Council led by military leader Min Aung Hlaing said that the country will adopt a PR system. Until today, the Ministry of Information has held 21 press conferences and there has never been a day passed without talking about irregularities and frauds allegedly committed by the winning party- National League for Democracy (NLD) and the change in the electoral system.

The PR system was first advocated by the International Crisis Group during U Thein Sein’s regime. The proposal was supported by the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and a few ethnic minority parties. But there were political parties that suggested removing 25% of seats constitutionally held by the military to implement the PR system. This proposal was also coincidental with a landslide victory of NLD in the 2012 by-election. With the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity, the USDP sensed that the PR system was the more favoured system to beat its rival. 

USDP and military representatives argue that a move from FPP to PR will benefit ethnic minorities and smaller political parties because the system ensures their representatives in the parliament even if they win a small percentage. Thus, diverse groups of people would also be included in administration and government. 

From ethnic minorities’ perspective, it is not a good sign for several reasons. First, the 2008 constitution is not inclusive and fair. Apart from 25% of seat reservations, elected members do not have the power to elect their chief minister but only the president under the constitution. Thus, it would only increase the number of representatives from the USDP under the PR system, enabling the military’s monopoly on the election of the president. 

Secondly, even though the date of the election has not been announced, given the constitutional limit on the emergency declaration, it is expected that the next general election could be held between February to August 2023. The announcement of the election date is important for ethnic minority parties because the campaign period is only two months which is noticeably short for some ethnic political parties to strategize campaigns and voter education which requires a lot of time for preparation. In addition, the military junta has introduced a new election law which requires political parties to have 100,000 members within three months of registration, have offices in 330 townships, and have funds amounting to 100 million kyats. If these conditions are not met, small and ethnic parties would be automatically disqualified for upcoming elections.  

Finally, Myanmar’s political situation is already fragile with a long history of armed conflicts between ethnic armed groups and successive governments even before the coup of 2021. But this coup has worsened the socioeconomic and political crisis. The coup also produced another group of armed resistance known as the People’s Defence Force (PDF). Now, aided by some ethnic armed groups, PDF is fighting against the military, and it is likely to continue unless they can come to political compromises. It is more severe in ethnic areas such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine State, and regions such as Sagaing and Magwe. Even the two most peaceful cities- Yangon and Naypyidaw are not immune from guerrilla attacks from PDF. Therefore, ethnic parties and smaller parties will have difficult tasks ahead to pick momentum they have built over the past years without sufficient preparation for the upcoming election if that happens. 

Change from one year or one election from the one before is often exaggerated. We perceive changes more readily than how things stay the same. Politics in particular tends to advance by increments, at least for most generations. Nigeria may test the stasis hypothesis in the upcoming July 2023 election. However, the changes may be on the margin as ethnic, religious, trbal, and language loyalties continue to influence political choices.

I admit to a strange hobby of comparing Nigerian and Bangladesh voting patterns. The two countries have roughly the same population of 165 million people and the geographical distribution is similar in terms of rural vs urban. Bangladeshi loyalties appear grounded in party networks more than socio-cultural characteristics, yet that may be just casual empiricism.

If there exists a subtle international dialectic in post-colonial democracies, what happens in Lagos may affect results in Dhaka. A fun theory at least.

https://www.theafricareport.com/279233/nigeria-2023-will-the-election-follow-the-2019-poll-pattern/?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=post_articles_facebook_30_01_2023&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR09IdVO1UG8r8Ad6zUCk-Iw_y5Oe_6M2iqACXZZWCVmZkAWdzHi0cZlcYA

Mo Ibrahim foundation report: African governance ‘backslides’ on democracy

Mo Ibrahim foundation report: African governance ‘backslides’ on democracy
— Read on hicginewsagency.com/2023/01/27/mo-ibrahim-foundation-report-african-governance-backslides-on-democracy/

The saga of the Government’s legal actions against Candlelight party leader Thach Setha takes an odd twist. After a flurry of threats from PM Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party, some in the Candlelight leadership issued a statement “correcting” its accusations. The Candlelight grassroots are in no mood for kowtowing. They are the front line. They bear the brunt. Message to Candlelight leadership: you need us. The grassroots are right on their importance. If mobilized, the July 2023 General Election could be a tougher contest than usual. In horse race track lingo, who will be the “Bismarck?”

Professor Cheeseman’s article on ideas and ideologies stands out as guide to the deeper currents of democracy and opposition in Africa. A professor at the University of Birmingham, he founded www.democracyinafrica.org To examine the role of ideas in Africa, a new research group has started.

Here’s a telling Cheeseman passage that suggests the role of opposition parties in Africa’s democracies will gain in legitimacy and influence.

“Ethnicity and clientelism are powerful forces, but their importance varies dramatically, and they are easier to mobilise for leaders who are seen to be credible and have a viable plan.

A well-known Ethiopian proverb runs: “When the great lord passes, the peasants bow and silently fart”. Voters in countries like Kenya, Malawi and Zambia have always critiqued those in power – and that critique is becoming more sophisticated with every passing election.

Failing to recognise the power of ideas and ideologies can therefore be fatal, both for political leaders trying to hold onto power and for researchers and journalists seeking to explain how politics works.”

Cheeseman is joined by other scholars in emphasizing that despite the challenges, the future of Africa is more not less democracy.

“The “supply” of democracy in Africa is under threat not only from the covid-19 pandemic, but also from rising insurgencies in parts of the continent, the growing influence of China with its indifference to democratic governance, and the internal challenges facing some Western democracies. Much of Africa remains caught up in a struggle between leaders who would circumscribe democracy and retreat from democratic openings and individuals who lay themselves on the line to defend and extend them. Data from recent Afrobarometer surveys confirm that most ordinary Africans remain unflinching in their preference for democracy and core democratic norms and institutions.”

Gyimah-Boadi, E., C. . Logan, and J. Sanny. “Africans’ Durable Demand for Democracy”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 32, no. 3, July 2021, pp. 136-51.

A time to reflect and eat well. From all of us at Opposition International

Yesterday, the OI blog reported on the controversial arrest of Candlelight Party leader, Thach Setha, alleged of  passing bad cheques, in 2019 – over three years ago. The freer media noticed discrepancies such as the cheques’ not being signed. Others noted the timing in the lead-up to the July 2023 national elections and that Candlelight has become the number one opposition party after an impressive showing in local elections last year.  The Cambodia People’s Party, headed since 1993 by  Prime Minister Hun Sen, denied any political interference.

The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) has issued an important statement calling for the attention of the international community. Sadly, such calls tend to get the answering service.

Our questions:

Is the world paying attention? 

The American-led Summit of Democracies will be held on March 29-30 in Costa Rica and the European-led Alliance of Democracies’ Copenhagen Democracy Summit on May 15-16. Will these summits make clear statements of support for opposition leaders, such as Thach Setha, facing irregular loss of freedom by their governments?

Will they name names and highlight the facts of opposition leaders who are the real frontline of democracy? There is no effective democracy without free opposition leaders.

It is not enough to swear allegiance to democracy. The call to duty requires helping those who make the deep sacrifices.

It’s not easy for the international community to help in every single specific case.  Unanimity is rare. Autocratic governments bristle at any outside  statement  about their “domestic affairs” or police actions   or legal  processes. To comment is not seen as diplomatic. There are too many cases to handle  usefully. Some are not well-documented and others ambiguous. The international media wants saints and heroes. Bigger issues can get lost by  focusing on victims.  Nuances get lost in the headlines. 

But as Nelson Mandela proved, individuals, even politicians, can rise to become symbols of great causes from anti-apartheid to genocide prevention to the right to cast a vote. People remember people better than the foreign communiques that supported their causes. But the foreign communiqués helped to keep these opposition leaders,  their aspirations and democracy alive. 

The world must take  these one step at a time. But we must speak out for one captive then another. 

So close to the national elections, jailing the Candlelight Party’ Thach Setha for pretrial detention, on charges that carry two to five years in prison look desperate on the part of Prime Minister Hun Sen, his party and his government. It stains reputation of Cambodia’s legal system.

Before these meeting in Costa-Rica and Copenhagen, let’s start bringing home democracy’s prisoners of war. The term POW may jar our ears. Listen to the autocrats’ language,  they speak with the tropes of war. 

Opposition International is compiling a list of opposition figures either in jail or facing  detention who deserve particular attention to their case.  It will be representative before it ever becomes  exhaustive, unfortunately.

Please send us any suggestions for individuals. All information will be handled confidentially. 

Meanwhile, we hope that we will not have to put Thach Setha’s name on that list. We call for the immediate release of Thach Setha of the Candlelight Party and fair proceedings in the Cambodia’s justice system.

Without a strong opposition voice that are actually heard, Cambodia will have difficulty claiming to be a democracy where elections are fair.

Thach Setha, a head figure in the Candlelight party, current leading opposition party, faces possible jail terms for bouncing cheques in 2019. No one will be surprised if poltical motives are behind charges. The current government for nearly 4o years has pursued through creative legal means any potential rival.

The curiosity is that millions of dollars have flowed into Cambodia for judicial and legal reform. What in the independence of the police and courts has changed when politics are involved? Which is just about everything in Cambodia.

As few answers are published, observers are excused if they form their own verdict.

www.thestar.com/amp/news/world/asia/2023/01/17/cambodian-opposition-politician-arrested-for-bounced-checks.html

Vietnam remains in the grasp of a war-hardened Communist Party. It has the second highest restrictive Internet censorship, only North Korea exceeds it. A free press and a free judiciary are not planned for any time soon.

Yet, it’s semi-capitalist economy is chugging along well with investment capital transferred out of China, a younger and better educated workforce than most, a large diaspora send remittances and renewed expectations, a freer labour movement, and there is history. Vietnam was a democracy of sorts for a generation between French colonial rule and the last helicopter off the U.S. Embassy roof on April 30, 1975.

The Diplomat ran an insightful piece in 2021 on the background to the hidden debate about democracy in Vietnam.

https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/vietnams-great-debate-over-democracy/

The Fulcrum, the journal of the Yusof Ishak Institute, recently published an article by Le Hong Hiep, their Vietnam analyst, about the political drama surrounding the replacement of President Nguyen Xuan Phuc.

Politics in the Poliburo does not portend liberalization. It does show all-too-human disagreement and indecision. To quote the Leonard, himself, “There is a crack in everything. That’s how the light gets in.”

fulcrum.sg/red-card-for-the-president-vietnams-biggest-political-drama-in-decades/

Corporations Canada sends an email today reminding that Opposition International has existed for one year now and a tax return needs filing by March 14, 2023. Notification of any changes to the Board of Directors or bylaws should also be sent. Changes incur a $200 fee.

Over the last year OI has developed a small ardent group of supporters and has established a foothold in social media. We have a website blog, a Substack account, a podcast account, and Mailchimp coupled to Woo Commerce to help with fundraising. Effort is needed to get all these wonderful programs working. For example, I am working on using Openai’s ChatGPT to do a daily news agregation on the state of opposition politics on select countries. Initial tests still point to a need for further calibration of the question posed.

Direct contact with people on the ground is vital. We have established conversations with a growing number of individuals engaged with opposition research and analysis: in Africa — Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa, Botswana, C.A.R., Tunisia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Mauritius. In Asia, India, Oakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore, Indonesis, and Philippines. Our Kazakhstan and Hong Kong contacts are active but concerned. In South America, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti,with Costa Rica being a base for Central American countries. Our focus on Europe is in the South and East. Many organizations are active there so our focus for now is on assessment on advanced opposition research.

We are a way still from functioning as full scale media and information resource for and about opposition parties. Engagement, training, and potentially opposition-specific election-monitoring needs more in-depth planning.

A lot hinges on the resources available. The decision was made to hold off on targeted individual fundraising until we had a clearer pitch to disseminate. Far more effort is needed to solicit major donations from individuals and foundations.

It needs to clear where we stand. Initial donor perceptions of OI stretch from a traditional educational NGO to a political advocacy initiative. We are solidly non-partisan in that we will liaise and assist opposition parties left, right, and centre and issue-based ones. They should profess to the Rule of Law and democratic principles.

OI’s mission is build support for opposition parties in their traditional role as the key to democratic accountability. That idea lost favour due to concerns about partisan polarization and the allure of corporatist representation of identities. The constitutional centrality of the Opposition needs restatement and on-the-ground reinforcement in evolving democracies.

Personally, the year began in the snows of Toronto and ends in a typhoon in the Philippines. I am back in Toronto in March. Planned trips ahead are the United States, Bangladesh, and, if possible, the V-Dem Institute in Gothenburg, Germany and the Institute for Opposition Studies, Bolton, U.K.

Is it really possible? Financial and personnel stability, the gathering and availability of useful information, and a robust and appreciated outreach to opposition parties. People helping out at least say so. Thank you Patrick, Jeann Probashi, George, Tatina, Alair, Alejandro, William, Soo, Kenneth, Ade, Henry, Agnes, Iqbal, Zahid, Mahoud, Nazmul, Sajid, Saad, Kamran, Shahmeem, Sohana, Dighol, Forrest, Tricia, Thy, Kenneth, Alonzo, Dimash, Lianne, Yu-ming, Franckie, and others.

Best to all in 2023!

Kenya’s 2022 election attracted many observer teams from international agencies, large foundations, and a plethora of democracy groups. The Kofi Annan report stand out as among the best and critically as the leading African assessment.

https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/publications/report-kenya-2022-post-election-review/

Several court cases continue and their verdicts, while unlikely to alter the results, may provide fresh insights. Opposition International takes a strong stand on the right of opposition candidates to access the courts to determine if an electoral law has been violated. Having commissions adjudicate disputes, in essence, themselves, does not provide adequate safeguards. The courts grind slowly, but exceedingly fine.

Electoral integrity once a dusty, bureaucratic affair has come to dominate post-election discussion. The level of suspicion and belief in unseen forces has been called irrational by Harvard psychologist, Stephen Pinker, The Annan report addresses the challenge. Read the full report linked in text.

www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-navalny-russia-opposition/

Fast Facts About Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny

Russian opposition leader, Navalny, is quickly becoming a household name in the world of politics. He has taken on the Russian government head-on, and has been arrested and convicted of fraud multiple times. Despite this, his popularity among the Russian people remains high.

Navalny’s history and background

Navalny was born in the USSR in 1976, in a small town called Kirov. His father was a factory worker and his mother was a seamstress. Navalny’s family was poor, and he did not have many opportunities to enjoy a childhood. However, he developed a strong passion for politics at an early age. In 1998, Navalny graduated from high school and began studying law at Moscow State University. As a lawyer, he became involved in the Russian opposition movement in 2006 after he witnessed widespread fraud during Russia’s presidential election. Navalny began his political career by organizing protests and showing solidarity with people who had been arrested or persecuted for their activism. In 2013, he founded the Anti-Corruption Foundation, which continues to be one of the most active Russian opposition groups.

Navalny has been arrested and convicted of fraud multiple times, but remains popular with the Russian people. In a 2018 poll, he was declared the most popular politician in Russia. Navalny’s popularity is likely due to his undying dedication to fighting corruption and his unwavering belief that democracy can work even in a corrupt society.

His imprisonment and convictions

Navalny has been arrested and convicted of fraud multiple times. His convictions for these crimes have led to lengthy prison sentences. In some cases, he has even been sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite the long jail terms, Navalny remains popular with the Russian people.

His future political plans are unknown, but he is likely to continue to be an influential opposition leader in Russia.

The linked Wired story about Wikipedia’s 21-year-old struggle against state-sponsored disinformation provides valuable background to the question of campaigns against opposition parties, though not addressing it directly. Most disinformation campaigns are what an informed person would expect. Russian trolls fighting internecine ex-Soviet era battles against upstart nationalists. Chinese army battalions of computer hackers trying to whitewash the web on any criticism of the CCP. After a decade of this chicanery, few takes anything on the web as gospel: even gullibility has limits. Still, the Wikipedia organization has gone to great effort to maintain balance. Opposition parties do not have a large presence on Wikipedia by my research. They could and should. As with all things it requires people, training, and time. Opposition International specializes in Forensic Opposition Research – many of us are caucus research alumni. Wikipedia has an established process for data entry and correction. Their volunteers are superb. Make a donation to the Wiki Foundation and have volunteers spend a couple of days to check enter, edit, or correct your party’s profile and mentions.

www.wired.com/story/wikipedia-state-sponsored-disinformation/