IN BRIEF
The Supreme Court of the Philippines’ decision to exclude Sulu from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao is likely to cause unrest, escalate political tensions and disrupt public service delivery. The exclusion risks regional instability by threatening Bangsamoro unity and self-determination, unsettling transitional governance mechanisms and sparking grievances among Sulu residents deprived of special resources and representation in the democratic peace process. As the 2025 regional elections approach, the decision could further polarise political alliances and challenge peace process in Bangsamoro.
On 9 September 2024, the Supreme Court of the Philippines made a critical decision on the constitutionality of Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). The decision stemmed from a petition filed by former Sulu governor Abdusakur Tan II, son of the current governor, to exclude Sulu from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).
The BOL was enacted in 2018 to implement the 2014 peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). While the final decision on Sulu’s exclusion is pending, this development has raised uncertainty and political and administrative disorder in the BARMM, risking regional instability due to the grievances among the Bangsamoro people who have fought for self-determination.
The term ‘Moro’ was first used by the Spanish in the 16th century to describe Muslims in Mindanao. Over time, people in the region started using the term to unify various Muslim ethnolinguistic groups, such as Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan and Sama, under the sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao to resist Western colonisation. In the post-independence Philippine state, Moro and Bangsamoro (Moro Nation) became unifying principles for the secessionist movement and the creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
Aside from a push for self-determination that resulted from injustice and human rights violations committed by the state, one of the MNLF’s early objectives was to restructure the feudal structure of Muslim society and eliminate the upper class, including political clans and dynasties who were inclined to maintain and expand their powers and pursue their interests. But when this agenda became apparent, many clan leaders who initially supported the movement distanced themselves from the MNLF.
The MILF, a splinter group of the MNLF initially led by Hashim Salamat from Maguindanao, continued this agenda through an ongoing peace process led by his successor Ahod B (Murad) Ebrahim, now the Chief Minister of the BARMM. In the 2014 peace agreement and the subsequent legislative act known as the BOL, it was stipulated that the new autonomous region would adopt a parliamentary system to transform centralistic and personal dynasty-based politics into a more representative and consultative system.
This shift was perceived as threatening to political clans and dynasties, challenging their ability to maintain their power and resources. In Sulu, where leaders like Governor Tan have tremendous influence over voting behaviour, the BOL was rejected during ratification.
People in the BARMM are preparing for the 2025 parliamentary election, which will determine the composition of the regional government after the transitional period ends. By June 2024, 16 political parties and around 1411 sectoral organisations had registered their applications for accreditation at the electoral offices, including the MILF’s United Bangsamoro Justice Party and the BARMM Grand Coalition, composed of four parties led by traditional politicians who support Sulu Governor Tan as the Chief Minister of BARMM. This situation has intensified political tensions between the United Bangsamoro Justice Party and the BARMM Grand Coalition ahead of the 2025 election.
The Supreme Court’s decision to exclude Sulu from the BARMM is a historical turning point for the Bangsamoro people. Beyond anticipated challenges in recalibrating administrative and electoral boundaries for the 2025 parliamentary election, the implications are significant for the region’s historical and cultural identities, governance and the Bangsamoro peace process.
The collective identity of Bangsamoro has unified the community to create a political entity that can exercise autonomy based on the right of self-determination. Historically, Tausug-dominated Sulu has been central to the Bangsamoro struggle against state oppression and injustice, with many MNLF heroes and mujahideen originating from Sulu. But Sulu governor Tan, who has had vested interests since the US occupation, prefers to hold dominant power in Sulu, not under the region created as a product of the MILF (Maguindanao)-led peace process. The exclusion of Sulu — which comprises approximately one million or one-fifth of the total population in the BARMM — risks fracturing the Bangsamoro identity, unity and solidarity.
The Supreme Court’s decision will create administrative and governance problems in delivering essential public services and ‘peace dividends’ in Sulu. Before the decision, the powers and resources of basic services such as education and health were managed by the BARMM government rather than devolved to local governments as in other regions in the Philippines.
To avoid service disruptions, the existing intergovernmental body between the national government and the BARMM government should urgently set up a clear transitional mechanism to safeguard the welfare of Sulu’s residents. Sulu will not receive special resources granted to other regional governments including finance, management of natural resources and the justice system, which may lead to grievance among the people in Sulu.
Any institutional rearrangement involves political consequences within the broader regional political landscape. Transferring certain powers and resources from the BARMM to Sulu implies a power division or reconfiguration of authority between the two regions, fragmenting the power centred on the Bangsamoro government. This approach by the state can be viewed as a political settlement to ease tension and reduce violence between the MILF-led BARMM and Tan-led Sulu in the lead-up to the 2025 parliamentary election. But long-term regional stability remains uncertain due to persistent grievances among the Bangsamoro leaders and people.
Exercising special powers through territorial autonomy under the Bangsamoro government is part of the reconciliation of historical grievances and political participation of the Bangsamoro people. Excluding Sulu from the BARMM prevents its people from participating in a democratic peace process and having their voices represented through elected officials. The implications of this might lead to regional instability. Institutional mechanisms for reconciliation should be formed to address the concerns and grievances of the people, especially in Sulu, enabling continuous dialogue through formal and informal channels.